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JURISDICTION 
An order denying a motion .0 set aside a judgme it is regarded as a final 
judgment and appealable. BIyth & Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 49 P. 1027,1028 (Utah 
1897). Accordingly, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), the Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction in this matter. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the 
Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue #1 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that Mr. Kearns failed to show 
that the judgment entered against him was due to excusable neglect considering that 
his wife had recently given birth to their first child, combined with the fact that his 
newborn son suffered from life threatening conditions ranging from severe allergies 
to complications with his digestive system? 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On June 24, 2000, Appellant filed a 
Notice of Appeal (R. 244-46) specifically preserving this issue for review on 
appeal. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review in determining whether 
a movant has demonstrated "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect" is abuse of discretion. See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1984); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
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Issue #2 
Did the trial court err in ruling that Mr. Kearns failed to show that he has a 
meritorious defense, given the express language contained in the Agreement and 
the potential offset based upon Wells Fargo's breach of its fiduciary duties it owed 
Mr. Kearns? 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On June 24, 2000, Appellant filed a 
Notice of Appeal (R. 244-46) specifically preserving this issue for review on 
appeal. 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether a defense is 
meritorious is a question of law, and accordingly, the appellate court reviews 
the trial court's finding for correctness. Under decisive Utah case law, 
"correctness" means that the appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 




Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ruling that Mr. Kearns failed to show that the judgment entered against him was due 
to excusable neglect considering that his wife, who was served with the Complaint, 
had recently given birth to their first child, combined with the fact that his newborn 
son suffered from life threatening conditions ranging from severe allergies to 
complications with his digestive system. 
Rather than considering and resolving the question of excusable neglect prior 
to any consideration of the issue as to whether a meritorious defense existed, the 
trial court simultaneously determined that Mr. Kearns failed to show excusable 
neglect and failed to demonstrate that he had a meritorious defense to the matters 
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raised in Wells Fargo's Complaint. This ruling was in spite of the express language 
in the Agreement which provided that the exclusive remedy for resolving any 
disputes stemming from the Agreement was binding arbitration. Not only was filing 
the Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court improper, but the judgment against 
Mr. Kearns provided for court costs and attorneys' fees which would have been 
avoided altogether had Wells Fargo abided by the parties' express intention that 
their disputes be resolved by binding arbitration rather than in court. 
Further, the refusal to set aside the default may have some negative impact 
upon Mr. Kearns' lender liability claims, which may offset all or a significant portion 
of the Judgment. Wells Fargo was acting as the Trustee of a trust in which Mr. 
Kearns was the primary beneficiary and breached its fiduciary duties to Mr. Kearns 
by the pursuit of this lawsuit. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On August 9, 1999, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") filed a 
Complaint against Mr. Kearns stemming from a dispute arising from a Line of Credit 
Agreement (the "Agreement") entered into between Mr. Kearns and Wells Fargo. (R. 
1-12). Despite knowing that Mr. Kearns was represented by counsel in another case 
involving Wells Fargo, on August 23, 1999, Wells Fargo opted to serve the 
Complaint and Summons upon Miriam C. Kearns ("Mrs. Kearns"), Mr. Kearns' wife. 
(R. 15). When the Complaint was served upon Mrs. Kearns she had recently given 
birth to their son. (R. 99 fl 3). Unfortunately, the newborn suffered from many 
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ailments ranging from severe allergies to complications with his digestive system. 
(R. 99 H 3; R. 96 U 2). Needless to say, Mrs. Kearns thoughts, emotions and efforts 
were expended on caring for her son and she neglected to immediately give the 
Complaint to Mr. Kearns. (R. 99fl 4; R. 96 H 3). Once alerted to the Complaint, Mr. 
Kearns failed to answer the Complaint or bring it to his attorney's attention given his 
own preoccupation with his son's condition. (R. 96 fl 4). 
On September 22,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Default Certificate as well as an 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. (R. 16; R. 17-21). On September 27,1999, 
a Default Judgment was entered against Mr. Kearns in favor of Wells Fargo in the 
sum of $266,351.85, costs in the sum of $107.00, attorneys' fees in the sum of 
$837.00, and interest in the sum of $5,094.18, for a total award of $272,390.03. (R. 
22-23). Subsequently, the Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed on October 
1,1999. (R. 26-27). 
On December 27, 1999, Mr. Kearns filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment. (R. 81-94). On March 1, 2000, the trial court denied Mr. Kearns' Motion 
to Set Aside the Default Judgment. (Addendum No. 1 (R. 241-43)). On March 28, 
2000, pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Kearns 
appealed the final Order of the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment entered on March 1, 2000. (Addendum No. 
2 (R. 244-46)). 
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C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler denied Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment ruling that although the motion was timely, Mr. Kearns failed to 
show excusable neglect and failed to demonstrate that he had a meritorious defense 
to the matters raised in Wells Fargo's Complaint. (R. 242 fflj 3-4). Particularly, the 
Court was not persuaded by Mr. Kearns' argument that the matter should have been 
arbitrated in accordance with the express language in the Agreement because the 
Court determined that Mr. Kearns had to make a formal election of arbitration before 
the Court in the civil action before the arbitration provision became effective. (R. 242 
114). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment 
entered against Mr. Kearns. Mr. Kearns provided the trial court with reasonable 
justification for his failure to appear and answer the Complaint based upon the facts 
that his wife had recently given birth and his newborn son suffered from life-
threatening ailments. 
Similarly, the trial court erred in ruling that Mr. Kearns did not have a 
meritorious defense. Even though Mr. Kearns never disputed that he owed Wells 
Fargo the loan amount pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Kearns' 
meritorious defense is rooted in the express language of the Agreement which 
provides that the only form of dispute resolution is binding arbitration. As a result, 
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Wells Fargo improperly filed the Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court and 
obtained a judgment against Mr. Kearns that exceeded the amount Wells Fargo was 
entitled to under the express language of the Agreement because Wells Fargo was 
awarded court costs and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Ruling That Mr. Kearns 
Failed to Show That the Judgment Entered Against Him Was Due 
to Excusable Neglect Considering That His Wife Had Recently 
Given Birth to Their First Child, Combined with the Fact That His 
Newborn Son Suffered from Life Threatening Conditions Ranging 
from Severe Allergies to Complications with His Digestive System 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment 
because Mr. Kearns had a reasonable justification for his failure to answer. The 
standard for setting aside a default judgment is set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1): 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Mr. Kearns' motion to set aside the default judgment was 
predicated upon excusable neglect. 
The trial court is given broad discretion in granting or denying Rule 60(b)(1) 
motions and the appellate court "will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of 
discretion is clearly established " Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 
429, 431 (Utah 1973); see also Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 
429 (Utah 1982). "No general rule can be laid down respecting the discretion to be 
exercised in setting aside or refusing to set aside a judgment by default but the 
discretion should always be so exercised as to promote the ends of justice." Utah 
Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033, 1037 (Utah 1898). 
Utah's well-settled policy with regard to setting aside default judgments is "that 
the courts should be liberal in granting relief against judgments taken by default to 
the end that controversies may be tried on the merits." Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 
1322,1323 (Utah 1979). The Utah Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged the 
coexistence of judicial policy with the broad deference accorded to the trial court in 
ruling upon motions predicated upon setting aside default judgments due to 
excusable neglect. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953); Mayhew 
v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962). The Utah Supreme Court has 
addressed the implementation of this policy as follows: 
It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is 
endowed with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying such 
motions. However, it is also true that the 
court cannot act arbitrarily in that regard, but 
should be generally indulgent toward 
permitting full inquiry and knowledge of 
disputes so they can be settled advisedly and 
in conformity with law and justice. To clamp 
a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a 
party without a hearing is obviously a 
harsh and oppressive thing. It is 
fundamental in our system of justice that 
each party to a controversy should be 
afforded an opportunity to present his 
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side of the case. For that reason it is 
quite uniformly regarded as a abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and timely application is 
made to set it aside. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d at 952 (citations omitted; emphasis 
added,). Clearly, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a judgment where 
there is reasonable justification for the defendants' failure to appear and answer. Id. 
In Westinghouse, the Utah Supreme Court further elaborated on 
implementation of public policy considerations: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases 
with dispatch and to move calendars with 
expedition in order to keep them up to date. 
But it is even more important to keep in mind 
that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity 
to be heard and to do justice between them. 
In conformity with that principle the 
courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgments where there 
is any reasonable excuse, unless it will 
result in substantial prejudice or injustice to 
the adverse party. 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah W15){citing Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b); Heathman v. Fabian & 
Clandenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962))(emphasis added); Utah Commercial & 
Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033 (Utah 1898)). 
Courts generally grant relief in questionable cases so that a party may have 
a hearing. In Warren, the court stated: 
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which 
may occur through procedural difficulties, the 
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a claim or 
defense. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953). 
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to vacate the judgment 
entered against Mr. Kearns because he had a reasonable justification for his failure 
to appear and answer. Mr. Kearns' reasonable justification stems from the dynamics 
associated with his wife recently giving birth to their son, combined with the fact that 
the newborn suffered from life-threatening conditions. It is reasonable that an 
individual enduring the same emotional and physical stress, resulting from the 
uncertainty of whether your newborn child would survive, may similarly fail to 
consider it a priority to respond to a Complaint. 
Additionally, Mr. Kearns was engaged in efforts to terminate the Kearns Trust 
at Wells Fargo, and he assumed that the Complaint was Wells Fargo's attempt to 
retaliate for his efforts to terminate a trust worth approximately $8 million dollars. 
Given that Wells Fargo managed his trust and provided the loan pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement, Wells Fargo knew that Mr. Kearns would not be able to pay 
the demanded amount on the loan until he could successfully terminate the Kearns 
Trust. Taking advantage of this knowledge, Wells Fargo filed the Complaint and 
deliberately served it upon Mrs. Kearns, at a time when Mr. Kearns was extremely 
vulnerable. Wells Fargo knew that Mr. Kearns was represented by Kirton & 
McConkie and easily could have contacted Eric C. Olson or Matthew K. Richards to 
request that they accept service on behalf of Mr. Kearns. Mr. Kearns set forth these 
facts in his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and requested an oral argument 
on this motion. In the Minute Entry dated January 31,2000, Judge Peuler found that 
although oral argument was requested, oral argument would not substantially assist 
the Court in rendering its ruling. 
In summary, given the trial court's abuse of discretion, this Court should 
reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to vacate the judgment 
entered against Mr. Kearns. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That Mr. Kearns Failed to Show a 
Meritorious Defense Given the Express Language in the 
Agreement That the Only Form of Dispute Resolution Is Binding 
Arbitration 
After considering and resolving the question of whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment entered against Mr. Kearns, this 
Court is faced with assessing whether the trial court was correct in ruling that Mr. 
Kearns failed to show a meritorious defense. 
In Musselman, the leading case establishing the requirement that one seeking 
to be relieved from a default judgment must additionally show that the motion was 
filed in a timely manner and that a meritorious defense to the action exists, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"In order for [Mr. Kearns] to be relieved from 
the default judgment, he must not only show 
that the judgment was entered against him 
through excusable neglect (or any other 
reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he must 
also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a 
meritorious defense to the action." 
State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,1055-56 (Utah 1983){citing Downey State Bank 
v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976); Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 
1322 (Utah 1979); DeHoney v. Hernandez, 595 P.2d 159 (Utah 1979); White v. 
Holm, 438 P.2d 581 (Utah 1968)). 
Similarly, in the Cox decision, the Utah Supreme Court set forth: 
[T]he policy in this jurisdiction requiring that 
the lower court consider and resolve the 
question of excusable neglect (when the 
motion to vacate the default judgment is 
based on excusable neglect) prior to its 
consideration of the issue of whether a 
meritorious defense exists. Furthermore in 
accordance with this policy, it is unnecessary, 
and moreover inappropriate, to even consider 
the issue of meritorious defenses unless the 
court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has 
been shown. 
State v. IV selman, 667 P.2d at 1056 (citing Board of Education of Granite School 
District v ox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963)). 
A. Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Was Timely 
under Rule 58a of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Mr. Kearns filed his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment in a timely manner. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c) provides in relevant part: 
When judgment entered; notation in register 
of actions and judgment docket. A judgment 
is complete and shall be deemed entered for 
all purposes . . . when the same is signed 
and filed as herein above provided. The 
clerk shall immediately make a notation of 
the Judgment in the register of actions and 
the judgment docket. 
(Emphasis added) Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c)(1999). Under Rule 58A(c) "a judgment is 
complete and deemed entered for all purposes when the same is signed and filed." 
In re Bundy's Estate v. Bundy, 241 P.2d 462, 467 (Utah 1952). 
The court docket in this case reflects that even though Judge Peuler signed 
the Default Judgment on September 23, 1999, it was not filed by Judge Peuler's 
clerk nor entered into the registry of judgments until September 27, 1999. 
Considering that the Default Judgment was not deemed "entered" pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 58A until September 27,1999, Mr. Kearns had until December 27, 
1999, to file a motion to set aside the entry of default. Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment was filed on December 27,1999, and, therefore, within the 
three-month time period required under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
B. Mr. Kearns Has a Meritorious Defense to this Action, Rooted 
in the Express Language of the Agreement, That Binding 
Arbitration Is the Only Form of Dispute Resolution To Which 
These Parties Agreed, and Wells Fargo's Filing of the 
Complaint in the Third District Court Was Improper 
Wells Fargo's filing of the Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court was 
improper given the express terms of the Agreement. The Agreement, drafted by the 
Wells Fargo, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Binding Arbitration. You agree that any Dispute not 
resolved informally, regardless of when it arose, will be 
settled in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration 
Program at the election of any party. A "Dispute" shall 
include any dispute, claim or controversy of any kind 
involving you or us, whether in contract or in tort, legal or 
equitable, now existing or hereafter arising, relating in any 
way to this Agreement or any related agreements (the 
"Documents"), or any past, present or future loans, 
services, agreements, relationships, incidents or injuries 
of any kind whatsoever relating to or involving the Private 
Banking Group or any successor group or department of 
Lender. Any party to a Dispute may by summary 
proceeding bring any action in court to compel arbitration 
of any Dispute. Any party who fails to submit to binding 
arbitration following a lawful demand by the opposing party 
shall bear all costs and expenses incurred by the opposing 
party in compelling arbitration of any Dispute. The parties 
agree that by engaging in activities with or involving each 
other as described above, they are participating in 
transactions involving interstate commerce. THE 
PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR DISPUTES 
SHALL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION 
RATHER THAN IN COURT, AND ONCE DECIDED BY 
ARBITRATION NO DISPUTE CAN LATER BE 
BROUGHT, FILED OR PURSUED IN COURT BEFORE 
A JUDGE OR JURY. 
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Given this language in the Agreement, Mr. Kearns has a meritorious defense to this 
action because he was entitled to compel arbitration of this Dispute, coupled with the 
fact that binding arbitration is the only form of dispute resolution to which the parties 
agreed. 
Although Mr. Kearns has never refuted that he owed Wells Fargo 
$250,000.00, plus interest, he does dispute the Wells Fargo's choice of venue as 
well as the attorney's fees and court costs. Further, the amount of money Mr. 
Kearns owed to Wells Fargo may be offset in whole or in part, or may even be 
exceeded by Mr. Kearns's lender liability claims against Wells Fargo. In short, not 
only was Wells Fargo's decision to file this Complaint improper, but Wells Fargo was 
inappropriately awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
should be reversed and remanded, with instructions to set aside the default 
judgment and allow Mr. Kearns an opportunity to file an Answer or other appropriate 
response. 
Dated: June 16, 2000. 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
MarR A.\LarsW 
JoHeen S\ Mantas 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the 
panies' Notice to Submit. Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed 
a Responsive Memorandum and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was 
requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a 
ruling on Defendant's Motion. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and 
the resulting pleadings, along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the 
following ruling: 
f t * — ~ *•* * * ~ ^ 
By 
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1. On December 27,1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, 
3<^r OA£ ft («*)<=* ^/a*7,(W 
which Judgment was signed by this Court Dooombcr 23, 1999. Defendant's Motion was 
accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns. 
2. Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely 
fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
3. Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect. 
4. Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters 
raised in Plaintiffs Complaint. Particularly, the Defendant's claim that the matter should have been 
arbitrated is not persuasive as the arbitration provision under the Note sued upon by Plaintiff 
required a formal election of arbitration to be made by Defendant before the Court in the civil action, 
which did not occur in this case. 
5. Defendant's Motion to set Aside the Default Judgment is denied. to set Aside iNWk 
DATED this __[ day of Feferaajy, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Kfyf^^JU.oU^Ui 
HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that on the 10 day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and signed correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047-4139 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 8 2000 
MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
JOLEEN S. MANTAS (8562) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, notice is hereby given 
that Defendant Michael J. Kearns, through Mark A. Larsen and Joleen S. Mantas, appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court the final Order of the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment entered on March 1, 2000. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
€©PY 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
Dated: March 24, 2000. 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
Mark A.XLarse^J" 
Joteen S) Mantas 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on March 24\ 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
OF APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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